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THE ORIGINAL (?) PUBLIC (?) MEANING OF “COMMERCE” 
Mark R. Killenbeck* 
The primary claim of the “new originalism” is incredibly seductive.  
As the always eloquent Randy Barnett explains, this technique simply 
“seeks the meaning actually communicated to the public by the words 
on the page.”1  As a result, troubling questions that previously re-
quired subjective attempts to “channel” the Framers have now be-
come “empirical” inquiries.2  Rather than casting about for a favorite 
source and a copacetic quotation, individuals interested in what the 
Constitution actually, really, truly means can diligently pursue “the 
objective meaning of the text at a particular point in time, rather 
than a counterfactual reconstruction of the subjective intentions of an 
individual or group.”3  So, for example, “commerce”—for the pur-
poses of understanding congressional power to “regulate” it “among 
the several states”—is “the trade, traffic, and transportation of things 
from one place to another.”4  Nothing less, and certainly nothing 
more.5 
This has tremendous initial appeal for all sorts of reasons.  It’s ob-
jective.  It adheres to the text.  It’s grounded in history.  Above all 
else, it places key aspects of constitutional interpretation in the hands 
 
 * Wylie H. Davis Distinguished Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law.  Kudos to 
the organizers and participants in this Symposium, all of whom made it an extraordinarily 
enriching experience.  Special thanks to the editors and staff of the Journal, who have 
been a delight to work with.  Special thanks to three individuals I have known for a long 
time who have been patient with and supportive of my efforts to puzzle through these 
questions:  Jack Rakove, Joel Goldstein, and Randy Barnett.  That said, this Article’s flaws 
(likely many) and virtues (hopefully a few) are mine alone. 
 1 Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 413 
(2013).  
 2 Compare Randy E. Barnett, The Relevance of the Framers’ Intent, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
403, 405 (1996) (“One may think of this as a type of constitutional ‘channeling’ in which 
originalist clairvoyants ask:  ‘Oh Framers, tell us what would you think about the following 
law?’”), with Barnett, Gravitational Force, supra note 1, at 415 (“[T]he New 
Originalism. . . . seeks to discover an empirical fact about the world.”). 
 3 Barnett, supra note 1, at 415. 
 4 Randy E. Barnett, Jack Balkin’s Interaction Theory of “Commerce,” 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 623, 
631–32 (2012). 
 5 Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 609 (2004) (“The 
new originalism . . . . requires judges to uphold the original Constitution—nothing more, 
but also nothing less.”). 
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of the individuals most concerned—“We the People”—rather than in 
the hands of “tyrants,” whatever their description.6  Indeed, it is 
tempting to call it the “by damn I can prove it” school of interpreta-
tion. 
Unfortunately, my reading of the pertinent records tells me that 
there are serious problems with this approach.  These are especially 
troubling given my historical bent, practiced without the formal train-
ing of a historian, but with an historian’s inclinations to adhere to 
“the cruel tyranny imposed by . . . respect for the authority of docu-
ments.”7 
I am not at all convinced that the individuals whose words and ac-
tions matter the most for these purposes would accept either the new 
originalism’s premise or many of the conclusions that follow from its 
application.  Like my friend, Jack Rakove, when I want to puzzle out 
what the Founding generation was about, I much prefer the company 
of the persons who actively wrote, debated, ratified, and implemented 
the Constitution, as opposed to the views and understandings of a 
counterfactual “Joe the Ploughman,”8 the new originalism’s “reason-
able speaker of English . . . at the time.”9   
I have spent a fair amount of time reading the words of the Fram-
ers and Founders and examining their actions.  The individuals who 
wrote the text—many of whom played key roles in the subsequent rat-
ification debates—did not believe that they were writing and recom-
mending a document whose meaning became fixed at the point it 
was ratified.  I am not suggesting that they did not have particular 
things and specific consequences in mind.  They did, and many as-
pects of those expressed “meanings” command respect.  But, these 
individuals also understood that framing and ratification were simply 
 
 6 Justice Antonin Scalia argues that these should be matters of “law,” rather than of an “un-
expressed intent” that risks becoming “tyrannical.”  A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW:  AN ESSAY BY ANTONIN SCALIA 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 
1997).  He and Bryan Garner, in turn, claim that “Originalism is the only approach to 
[the] text that is compatible with democracy” and “the only objective standard of inter-
pretation even competing for acceptance.”  ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, 
READING LAW:  THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 82, 89 (2012). 
 7 Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, The Poverty of Public Meaning 
Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575, 586 (2011).  
 8 See generally id. (analyzing the use of an “imaginary originalist reader who never existed 
historically”).  For a variation on this theme, see Larry Alexander, Originalism, or Who Is 
Fred?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 321, 321–22 (1996) (“[O]ur constitutional presupposi-
tions, which are just a set of norms we all share and are not themselves items to be inter-
preted, select Fred as the person whose recorded determinations shall be authoritative.”). 
 9 Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 105 
(2001).  
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necessary first steps in what many characterized as a continuing 
“great experiment” whose specific parameters and ultimate conse-
quences were uncertain.10 
More to the point, the available record simply does not support 
many of the conclusions that the new originalists reach about key 
constitutional provisions.  So, for example, my reading of the record 
leads me to disagree, respectfully, but firmly, with the views on the 
Commerce Clause taken by new originalism’s major academic pro-
ponents and, for that matter, originalism’s adherents on the Supreme 
Court, be they “new,” “faint-hearted,” or otherwise.11  These conflicts 
are not simply matters of perspective and do not depend on whether 
one adheres to a national or state-centric vision.  Rather, these are 
matters of both actual record and interpretive technique, influenced 
by specific details and, in particular, how one views the timeframe 
within which the inquiry should be conducted. 
Or, at least, so I believe and will now try to explain, with two im-
portant caveats.  First, I do not for a moment pretend that I am doing 
justice to complexities and nuances in the extensive literature both 
embracing and responding to the new originalism.12  More im-
portantly, I neither discuss nor address the issues posed by the dis-
tinction many new originalists draw between constitutional interpre-
tation and constitutional construction.13  Rather, my aims are more 
 
 10 For a discussion of the “experiment” metaphor and its implications, see Mark R. 
Killenbeck, Pursuing the Great Experiment:  Reserved Powers in a Post-Ratification, Compound 
Republic, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 81 (1999).  
 11 Justice Scalia, for example, once described himself as a “faint-hearted originalist,” a char-
acterization he now repudiates.  Compare Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989) (“I hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-
hearted originalist.”), with MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT:  THE STRUGGLE FOR THE 
CONSTITUTION 165 (2013) (noting that in a 2011 interview, “Scalia . . . ‘recanted’ being a 
‘faint-hearted originalist’”).  The impetus for the original statement was the likelihood 
that strict adherence to originalism would produce harsh results, such as approval of 
flogging as a punishment for a crime.  By “recanting,” Justice Scalia signaled his willing-
ness to accept where originalism took him, stressing that a given practice (e.g., the 
“notching of ears”) may be “a stupid idea,” but “not unconstitutional.”  COYLE, supra at 
165. 
 12 For a readable outline of the complexities and varieties of originalism today, see Law-
rence B. Solum, What Is Originalism?  The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory, in 
THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM:  THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12 
(Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011). 
 13 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 95, 100–03 (2010) (discussing how “the linguistic meaning of an authoritative 
legal text”—interpretation—is paired with the “legal effect” of “the semantic content of a 
legal text”—construction).  My reading of the Founding suggests that the application of 
the text via the political process deserves independent consideration.  Then again, I don’t 
do theory, and this may simply mean that I don’t understand what those who do are talk-
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modest as I try to answer two questions.  First, does the new 
originalism square with certain key assumptions that informed the 
drafting and ratification of the Constitution?  Second, how do those 
assumptions impact application of new originalism insights on one of 
the most contentious and important current constitutional questions, 
what it means to “regulate” “commerce.”14 
I 
The new originalism’s primary claim is that we can and should re-
cover “the objective meaning that would be understood by a reasona-
ble person in the relevant community of discourse.”15  There is a great 
deal to be said for this.  The “community of discourse” during ratifi-
cation was indeed an assemblage that included Joe the Ploughman 
and his fellow citizens, individuals who both witnessed and participat-
ed in one of history’s most remarkable political transformations.  De-
scribed by one contemporary observer as “a spectacle never before 
displayed among men, and even yet without a parallel on earth,”16 late 
eighteenth-century constitutional and political debates in this nation 
were the province 
not of the learned and the wealthy only, but of the great body of the 
people; even a large portion of that class of the community which is des-
tined to daily labour, having free and constant access to public prints, re-
ceiving regular information of every occurrence, attending to the course 
of political affairs, discussing public measures, and having thus presented 
to them constant excitements to the acquisition of knowledge, and con-
tinual means of obtaining it.17 
 
ing about.  Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORIGINALISM:  A DEBATE 1, 3–4 (2011) (“[C]onstruction can also occur when Congress or 
the president acts in ways that require implementation of the Constitution.”). 
 14 Spoiler alert.  I will discuss only in passing the Court’s most recent Commerce Clause ex-
travaganza, National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), 
within which the conservative wing of the Court did violence to accepted understandings 
of the Clause in ways I hope will become the equivalent of prior “one off” rulings.  See, 
e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (“Our consideration is limited to the present 
circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes . . . presents 
many complexities.”). 
 15 Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 621 (1999).  
 16 2 SAMUEL MILLER, A BRIEF RETROSPECT OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY:  PART FIRST; IN 
TWO VOLUMES 253 (New York, T. and J. Swords 1803). 
 17 Id.  Newspapers played a key role in the ratification debates and, as Robert Rutland notes 
in an insightful discussion, “many a foreign visitor was taken aback to find that chamber-
maids, blacksmiths, farmers, and shopkeepers were also readers of newspapers.”  Robert Al-
len Rutland, The First Great Newspaper Debate:  The Constitutional Crisis of 1787–88, 97 PROC. 
AM. ANTIQUARIAN SOC’Y 43, 44 (1988). 
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It is accordingly tempting to begin and end first-level constitu-
tional inquiries with a quest for what Joe and his contemporaries read 
and understood.  The Constitution ultimately belonged to “We the 
People,” with the draft prepared and sent to them by the Constitu-
tional Convention, “merely advisory and recommendatory . . . unless 
it be stamped with the approbation of those to whom it is ad-
dressed.”18  That said, the individuals who wrote that document made 
it abundantly clear to our “reasonable” constitutional expositors that 
what they received in September 1787 was not intended to be defini-
tive in any number of key respects.  More to the point, as part of the 
ratification process, these same individuals made it equally obvious to 
“the People” that the text, as ratified, was a place to start, rather than 
an end in itself.  Indeed, the very indeterminancy of the Constitution 
became a dominant theme in attacks by Anti-federalists who declared 
that they did “not believe there existed a social compact . . . so vague 
and so indefinite as the one now on the table.”19 
Three particular realities inform my assessment of the record and 
its implications. 
The first was the difficulty involved in crafting a written constitu-
tion, much less one for a radically new “compound republic” within 
which there were multiple divisions of authority between and among 
multiple actors.20  As George Washington stressed in the letter ac-
companying the text when it was forwarded to the Confederation 
Congress, “It is at all times difficult to draw with precision the line be-
tween those rights which must be surrendered, and those which may 
be reserved . . . .”21  That letter, with its acknowledgment of drafting 
 
 18 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 264 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).  Like virtual-
ly everyone else, I attach great significance to the insights offered in The Federalist Papers 
given the stature of their authors and the role these individuals played in framing and rat-
ification.  It is, nevertheless, important to acknowledge that these essays were, like virtual-
ly all of the published materials at the time, partisan attempts to steer the debate toward 
Jay’s, Madison’s, and Hamilton’s preferred result.  See Rutland, supra note 17, at 53 
(“Surely The Federalist Papers have been read, and discussed in academic groves, more dur-
ing the past generation than they were in 1787–88.”). 
 19 William Grayson, The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia, on the Adop-
tion of the Federal Constitution, in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON 
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL 
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 583 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J. B. 
Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1896). 
 20 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961) (“In the 
compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people, is first divided be-
tween two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each, subdivided among 
distinct and separate departments.”). 
 21 Letter from the President of the Convention (George Washington) to the President of 
Congress (Sept. 17, 1787), in 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
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imperfection, was part of the package sent to “the several legislatures 
in order to be submitted to a convention of delegates chosen in each 
state by the people thereof.”22  Not surprisingly, the Constitution’s in-
determinacy became both a central contextual reality and a recurring 
complaint in the ratification process.  As James Wilson stressed in his 
key December 1787 “Statehouse Address,” when he responded to 
concerns expressed about the potential scope of the powers con-
ferred on the federal government, 
They have asserted that these powers are unlimited and undefined.  The-
se words are as easily pronounced as limited and defined . . . . [I]t is not 
pretended, that the line is drawn with mathematical precision; the inac-
curacy of language must, to a certain degree, prevent the accomplish-
ment of such a desire.  Whoever views the matter in a true light will see 
that the powers are as minutely enumerated and defined as was possi-
ble.23 
The individuals who met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 
recognized the importance of a written constitution, an incredible 
innovation at the time.  As Michael Warner has noted, “the written 
constitution was a way of literalizing the doctrine of popular sover-
eignty.”24  The Framers understood the need for a careful approach 
to their work and the obligation to produce a document grounded in 
first principles.  They were also pragmatists who crafted a proposal 
that did not purport to create the “ultimate Union,” only “a more 
perfect” one, within which an occasional lack of precision was the 
necessary corollary of compromise and accommodation.  Madison 
defended the proposed text as one that “promises stability to the pub-
lic Councils & security to private rights.”25  He conceded, neverthe-
less, that certain “line[s] of distinction” deemed essential were 
“found, on fair discussion, to be absolutely undefinable.”26  So, for ex-
ample, “[e]ven the boundaries between the Executive, Legislative & 
 
CONSTITUTION:  CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS, 1776–1787, at 305, 305 
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1976). 
 22 Journals of Congress, Friday, 28 September, in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 21, 
at 340, 340. 
 23 James Wilson, Reasons for Adopting the Constitution, in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION:  RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE 
STATES:  PENNSYLVANIA, at 492, 496 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976). 
 24 Michael Warner, Textuality and Legitimacy in the Printed Constitution, 97 PROC. AM. 
ANTIQUARIAN SOC’Y 59, 59 (1988). 
 25 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 6, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON, at 163, 164 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds, 1977). 
 26 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in  10 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON, supra note 25, at 206, 211. 
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Judiciary powers, though in general so strongly marked in themselves, 
consist in many instances of mere shades of difference.”27 
Individuals like George Mason were troubled by this and “re-
mark[ed] the different language held at different times.”28  That said, 
the goal was a written constitution, not a statute or common law legal 
opinion.  Justice Felix Frankfurter emphasized this when he focused 
our attention on John Marshall’s observation in M’Culloch v. Maryland 
that “we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expound-
ing.”29 
Frankfurter believed that this was “the single most important ut-
terance in the literature of constitutional law—most important be-
cause most comprehensive and comprehending.”30  That was certainly 
true for many of the reasons expressed in M’Culloch.  Marshall under-
stood that a written constitution could not “partake of the prolixity of 
a legal code,” but rather, by its very nature “requires[] that only its 
great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, 
and the minor ingredients which compose those objectives be de-
duced from the nature of the objects themselves.”31  He recognized 
that the Constitution was “intended to endure for ages to come, and, 
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”32  
Marshall also understood that his Court was giving active form to pre-
viously inchoate concepts.  Like others of his generation, he knew 
that the individual words in the text would be “used in various senses” 
and that “in [their] construction, the subject, the context, the inten-
tion of the person using them, are all to be taken into view.”33  Any 
other approach, he warned, would “change, entirely, the character of 
the instrument.”34 
All of this was front and center in ratification debates within which 
the proponents of indeterminacy prevailed.35  This does not mean 
 
 27 Id. 
 28 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 31 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 
1966) [hereinafter FEDERAL CONVENTION].  See id. at 323 (showing Rufus King’s com-
plaint about the extent to which key terms had been used “inaccurately & delusively”). 
 29 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
 30 Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REV. 217, 219 (1955). 
 31 M’Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407. 
 32 Id. at 415. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Madison believed that the frequency and intensity of Anti-federalist attacks on the text 
did not reflect actual levels of support for the Anti-federalist position.  See Letter from 
James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Oct. 21, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON, supra note 25, at 199, 199 (“Judging from the News papers one wd. suppose 
that the adversaries were the most numerous & the most in earnest.  But there is no other 
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that the Anti-federalists and their views have no place in these inquir-
ies.  The Constitution’s opponents played key roles in shaping the 
public dialogue and many of their insights about the nature and the 
scope of the document are valuable.  That said, as we “expound” the 
Constitution, we must also never forget that choices about its mean-
ing must, in many instances, be made in the light of the professed 
goals and understanding of those who championed it, rather than 
those of their opponents.36 
A second reality that is especially acute for the new originalists fol-
lows from James Wilson’s allusion to the “inaccuracy of language.”  
Words do have meanings, and those meanings may and do acquire 
common currency, such that I at least hope that no one engaged in 
serious constitutional discussion would ever treat with even a modi-
cum of seriousness the suggestion that the “right to bear arms” is any-
thing but a reference to the ability to acquire and own weapons.37  
The same words may nevertheless be more or less precise, depending 
on the complexity of the ideas they are being asked to convey.  As 
Madison stressed in Federalist 37, 
no language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for every com-
plex idea, or so correct as not to include many equivocally denoting dif-
ferent ideas.  Hence, it must happen, that however accurately objects may 
be discriminated in themselves, and however accurately the discrimina-
tion may be considered, the definition of them may be rendered inaccu-
rate by the inaccuracy of the terms in which it is delivered.  And this una-
voidable inaccuracy must be greater or less, according to the complexity 
and novelty of the objects defined.  When the Almighty himself conde-
scends to address mankind in their own language, his meaning, luminous 
as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful, by the cloudy medium 
through which it is communicated.  Here then are three sources of vague 
and incorrect definitions; indistinctness of the object, imperfection of 
the organ of conception, [and] inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas.38 
 
evidence that it is the fact.”).  This assessment was subsequently belied by the closeness of 
the ratification vote in many states. 
 36 Consider, for example, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s clever but misleading embrace of the 
notion that the Founders “split the atom of sovereignty,” a rhetorical device that is wrong, 
wrong, wrong as a matter of science, history, and constitutional policy, a point I make in  
Mark R. Killenbeck, The Physics of Federalism, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
 37 As opposed to being a reference “to . . . the limbs to which our arms are attached.”  Bar-
nett, supra note 1, at 6.  See id. (asking if the term “domestic violence” refers to “riots or 
spouse abuse”).  I think I understand why Randy and others choose the examples that 
they do.  I also believe that most of the ones they have selected are themselves counterfac-
tual and undermine our appreciation of the truly serious problems posed when major in-
terpretive issues arise involving genuinely contestable words or phrases.  In the 1780s and 
1790s, for example, no one with a modicum of intelligence or sense would have viewed 
the reference to domestic violence as anything other than an allusion to civil unrest. 
 38 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 236–37 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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These interpretive problems are compounded by the reality of 
context.  Many words are perfectly clear and perfectly defined at one 
point in time, for one particular purpose.  However, those same 
words may not carry the same meaning or implications in altered cir-
cumstances.  Thomas Jefferson, for example, recognized that in im-
portant respects, written constitutions were “wonderfully perfect for a 
first essay,” but also that “every human essay must have defects” and it 
“remain[s] therefore to those now coming on the stage of public af-
fairs to perfect what has been so well begun by those going off it.”39  
He subsequently acknowledged that ratification marked the begin-
ning of a new national journey, within which complex and evolving 
questions were to be “pursue[d] with temper and perseverance” as 
the people and their representatives struggled continuously to per-
fect “the great experiment which shall prove that man is capable of 
living in society, governing itself by laws self-imposed, and securing to 
its’ members the enjoyment of life, liberty, property and peace.”40 
The very nature of this radical enterprise meant that there would 
inevitably be interpretive difficulties, especially in the light of history 
and the changing roles of the states in our federal system.41  Madison 
was especially sensitive to this, stressing that the Constitution created 
a “novel and unique political system,” within which “new ide-
as . . . must be expressed either by new words, or by old words with 
new definitions.”42  Indeed, in an important letter written toward the 
end of his life, Madison criticized the assumptions following from 
what we might well characterize as an early-nineteenth-century exer-
cise in new originalism. 
The specific question was what had been meant by the terms “na-
tional” and “federal” as they were used during the ratification de-
bates.  John Taylor of Carolene had “assume[ed] for the term nation-
al a meaning co-extensive with a single consolidated Gov[t],”43 
 
 39 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Mann Randolph (July 6, 1787), in 5 THE WORKS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 298, 298 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904). 
 40 Thomas Jefferson, The Solemn Declaration and Protest of the Commonwealth of Virginia 
on the Principles of the Constitution of the US. of America and the Violations of Them, 
in 3 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS:  THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND 
JAMES MADISON 1776–1826, at 1944, 1946 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995). 
 41 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 543–44 (1985) (stress-
ing the need to “accommodat[e] changes in the historical functions of States” and that 
“[r]eliance on history as an organizing principle results in line-drawing of the most arbi-
trary sort”). 
 42 Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (April 17, 1824), in  9 THE WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON, 187, 189 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) [hereinafter Madison, WRITINGS]. 
 43 Letter from James Madison to N. P. Trist (Dec. 1831), in Madison, WRITINGS, supra note 
42, at 471, 473–75 [hereinafter Letter to Trist].  Taylor was a strong proponent of state 
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imputing a desire to do away with the states.  Madison would have 
none of it.  He stressed that any careful reading of the “whole course 
of [the] proceedings” would have told Taylor that “the term National 
as contradistinguished from Federal, was not meant to express more 
than that the powers to be vested in the new Gov[t] were to operate 
as in a Nat[l] Gov[t] directly on the people, and not as in the old 
Confed[cy] on the States only.”44  Madison admitted that some as-
pects of what had been said had been expressed in “loose terms.”45  
He, nevertheless, admonished that it was imperative to keep in mind 
the nature of what was being undertaken and its impact on words:  “It 
ought to have occurred that the Gov[t]. of the U.S. being a novelty & 
a compound, had no technical terms or phrases appropriate to it, 
and that old terms were to be used in new senses, explained by the 
context or by the facts of the case.”46 
The third and final problem is the most acute.  My reading of the 
record leads me ineluctably to the conclusion that the proof lies not 
in what the Framers and Founders said, or what Joe the Ploughman 
understood them to have said, but in what followed.  The critical 
question is not how the terms were understood in 1788.  As Hamilton 
stressed in Federalist 34, 
Constitutions of civil Government are not to be framed upon a calcula-
tion of existing exigencies; but upon a combination of these, with the 
probable exigencies of ages, according to the natural and tried course of 
human affairs.  Nothing therefore can be more fallacious, than to infer 
the extent of any power, proper to be lodged in the National Govern-
ment, from an estimate of its immediate necessities.  There ought to be a 
CAPACITY to provide for future contingencies, as they may happen; and, 
as these are illimitable in their nature, it is impossible safely to limit that 
capacity.47 
Madison recognized this and its implications for the necessary 
next steps after ratification.  As he stressed in Federalist 37, 
All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed 
on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or 
less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascer-
tained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.48 
 
rights and a prolific author.  Madison was concerned with the statements made in and the 
implications of one of his works.  JOHN TAYLOR, NEW VIEWS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES (Washington City, Way & Gideon 1823). 
 44 Letter from James Madison to N.P. Trist (Dec. 1831) in Madison, WRITINGS, supra note 
42, at 475. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 THE FEDERALIST NO. 34, at 210–11 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 48 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 236 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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One such “law” was the Constitution itself, a document that both re-
quired interpretation and was, by design, a general outline rather 
than a detailed blueprint.  It was also crafted with continuing aware-
ness of the fact that governance under its terms would be an evolving 
process.  As Hamilton noted in Federalist 36, “[C]ertain emergencies 
of nations, in which expedients that in the ordinary state of things 
ought to be foreborn, become essential to the public weal.  And the 
government from the possibility of such emergencies ought ever to 
have the option of making use of them.”49 
This does not mean that we cannot find a particular, commonly 
accepted meaning for a specific word or phrase at the time of ratifica-
tion.  It does suggest strongly that we must be sensitive to both the in-
itial context within which words were used and the subsequent cir-
cumstances within which they were applied.  It also means that we 
must treat with appropriate caution a central tenet in some iterations 
of the new originalism: 
[O]ne succinct way to define the New Originalism is . . . that the express 
and implied public meaning of the words on the page should remain the 
same until properly changed.  And the proper way to change “this Constitu-
tion” is provided in Article V.  Judges are not allowed to update the text 
of the Constitution by changing the meaning it had at the time of enact-
ment.50 
I agree completely that commonly accepted understandings of key 
constitutional terms should be taken into account as part of the in-
terpretive process.  So, for example, if Joe the Ploughman and his fel-
low constitutional savants did in fact have an objective, public sense 
of what the word commerce meant in 1788, then that certainly pro-
vides an appropriate starting point for our inquiries.  That does not 
mean, however, that a constitutional amendment is required before 
we can agree that the federal power to regulate commerce can be 
read to encompass something more than “trade, traffic, and transpor-
tation of things from one place to another.”51 
That is not how Madison and his contemporaries thought of these 
matters.  More tellingly, it is certainly not how events unfolded in the 
wake of ratification.  Perhaps the best example of this was the se-
quence and content of the debates about the constitutionality of the 
 
 49 THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, at 229 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 50 Barnett, supra note 1, at 9.  See Barnett, Originalism, supra note 15, at 654 (arguing that the 
Constitution works “only if its original meaning is not contradicted or altered without ad-
hering to formal amendment procedures”). 
 51 Barnett, Balkin’s Interaction Theory, supra note 4, at 631. 
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First and Second Banks of the United States.52  Representative James 
Madison led the opposition to Hamilton’s proposal to create the First 
Bank, speaking against it eloquently and at length during its consid-
eration by the House.  In particular, he questioned the propriety of 
reading the Necessary and Proper Clause as Hamilton and his allies 
would, stressing that “[i]f implications, thus remote and thus multi-
plied, can be linked together, a chain may be formed that will reach 
every object of legislation, every object within the whole compass of 
political economy.”53  Nevertheless, President James Madison, with 
the benefit of subsequent and different service—in particular, with 
the insights gained during the War of 1812—concluded, as a matter 
of both “public meaning” and national need, that a bank was both 
necessary and proper.  So, he declared in 1815, he had no constitu-
tional objections to chartering the Second Bank.  Rather, he 
[w]aiv[ed] the question of the constitutional authority of the Legislature 
to establish an incorporated bank as being precluded in my judgment by 
repeated recognitions under varied circumstances of the validity of such 
an institution in acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of 
the Government, accompanied by indications, in different modes, of a 
concurrence of the general will of the nation.54 
This is not a Madison whose “political career” should be 
“stamp[ed] . . . with discrediting inconsistencies.”55  The “mutability,” 
he insisted, was “apparent, not real,” with his change in position a re-
sponse to “a course of authoritative, deliberate, and continued deci-
sions” that were “an evidence of the Public Judgment, necessarily su-
perseding individual opinions.”56  These “precedents,” he stressed, 
did not “alter” the Constitution.  Rather, they simply “expound[ed]” 
it, “fix[ing its] interpretation.”57 
Simply put, the Madison of 1815 and 1831 recognized that the be-
liefs, perspectives, and meanings that prevailed in 1791 were not de-
finitive but were rather subject to a process of “liquidation and ascer-
 
 52 I discuss the constitutional debates about, and history of, the First and Second Banks in 
suitable detail, albeit not excessive length, in MARK R. KILLENBECK, M’CULLOCH V. 
MARYLAND:  SECURING A NATION (2006).  One interesting facet of the record is that the 
concerns about constitutionality that were so prominent when the First Bank was pro-
posed and during the failed attempt to renew its charter in 1811 largely disappeared after 
that, with constitutionality at best an afterthought in the lead up to the Second Bank.  See 
id. at 53–63. 
 53 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1899 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
 54 James Madison, Veto Message, Jan. 30, 1815, in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 327, at 
327 (Gaillard Hunt, ed., 1908). 
 55 Letter to Trist, supra note 42, at 471. 
 56 Id. at 476–77. 
 57 Id. 
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tainment” as a necessarily and inherently equivocal text was given ac-
tual meaning over time. 
II 
One recurring trope in constitutional discourse is the tendency to 
cite certain decisions as stalking horses for a world view with which an 
individual disagrees.  These are the doctrinal equivalents of George 
Carlin’s “Filthy Words,” cases that become “curse words and . . . swear 
words, the cuss words and the words that you can’t say, that you’re 
not supposed to say.”58  Perhaps the best illustration of this is that in 
many, if not most, minds, “Lochner” is not simply a reference to 
Lochner v. New York,59 within which the Court held that states could 
not limit the number of hours a baker could work in a given week.  
Rather, it stands for the proposition that federal courts should not 
“legislate from the bench,” a somewhat subjective recharacterization 
of the arguably unremarkable proposition that the Supreme Court 
should not “sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, 
and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, 
or social conditions.”60 
In a similar vein, key cases decided by the New Deal Court are 
viewed as constitutional “wrong turn[s],” a body of work that marks a 
“dramatic departure in the 1930’s from a century and a half of prec-
edent.”61  One such filthy case is Wickard v. Filburn,62 in which the 
Court held that Congress could use the commerce power to restrict 
the amount of grain a farmer grew, even where there was no intent to 
sell that grain on the open market.  Wickard has been repeatedly criti-
cized in originalist quarters as “fanciful,”63 a decision that is “far re-
moved from the core of interstate commerce—the exchange of 
 
 58 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 751 (1978) (quoting an FCC prepared transcript of 
the comedian George Carlin’s “Filthy Words” monologue broadcast over the radio). 
 59 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 60 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481–82 (1965) (declining the “invitation” to use  
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) as “our guide”); see Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 690 (1999) (noting “the discredited sub-
stantive-due-process case of Lochner”). 
 61 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 599 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
 62 317 U.S. 111 (1942);  see, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2643 
(2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ. dissenting) (characterizing Wickard as “the 
ne plus ultra of expansive Commerce Clause jurisprudence”). 
 63 Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1451 
(1987). 
302 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:2 
 
goods.”64  That was, of course, not how the opinion’s author saw it.  
Rather, Justice Robert Jackson viewed Wickard as part of a continuum, 
a line of cases designed “to bring about a return to the principles first 
enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall,”65 understandings expressed in 
the first case within which the Court parsed the Commerce Clause, 
Gibbons v. Ogden.66 
Justice Thomas disagrees with this characterization, arguing in 
Lopez that these and similar statements “misconstrue Gibbons.”67  As 
part of this, he emphasizes, as have many other originalists, Marshall’s 
discussion of “completely internal” commerce and his supposed ex-
clusion of certain types of activities from the clause’s reach.68  In a 
similar vein, Randy Barnett offers us a choice between James Madison 
and Franklin D. Roosevelt, within which the appropriate “means-ends 
fit” is either policed by the Court (Madison) or left wholly in the dis-
cretion of Congress (Roosevelt).69  As the first part of this Article sug-
gests, I am inclined to opt for Madison, albeit, as I will now argue, not 
for the reasons the new originalists do and certainly not to the same 
purpose and effect. 
A.  Commerce in Congress 
As a threshold matter, let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that 
on June 21, 1788—the date New Hampshire’s assent made the Con-
stitution binding—that there was widespread, perhaps even universal 
acceptance that the “objective” meaning of the word “commerce” was 
“trade, traffic, and transportation of things from one place to anoth-
er.”70  The important question, at least as I read the record, is what 
the applied meaning of that term became as the Commerce Clause 
was “liquidated and ascertained” by the individuals in a position to ac-
tually act on its meaning, the members of the First Federal Congress. 
 
 64 Raoul Berger, Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 695, 708 (1996). 
 65 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 122. 
 66 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).  The classic study of Gibbons had been MAURICE G. BAXTER, 
THE STEAMBOAT MONOPOLY:  GIBBONS V. OGDEN, 1824 (1972).  As good as it is, this volume 
has now been superseded by HERBERT A. JOHNSON, GIBBONS V. OGDEN:  JOHN MARSHALL, 
STEAMBOATS, AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE (2010). 
 67 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 594 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 68 Id. 
 69 See Randy Barnett, The Choice Between Madison and FDR, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1005, 
1014 (2008). 
 70 Barnett, supra note 4, at 630.  Or, as Justice Thomas argues, “selling, buying, and barter-
ing, as well as transporting for these purposes.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585.  Additional sup-
port for these narrow readings may be found in Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Meaning of 
“Commerce” in the Commerce Clause, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 789 (2006). 
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In June 1789, James Madison, Framer, became James Madison, 
Representative from Virginia, a career trajectory that he and nineteen 
others followed as they moved from the Convention in Philadelphia 
to the First Congress in New York.71  Aptly described at the time as “a 
second convention,”72 that gathering faced the daunting prospect of 
fashioning a working government within the framework provided by 
the text.  Everyone understood the importance of the task.  Future 
Justice James Iredell observed, during the ratification debates in 
North Carolina, that “[t]he first session of Congress will probably be 
the most important of any for many years.  A general code of laws will 
then be established in execution of every power contained in the 
Constitution.”73  The French ambassador to the United States not-
ed—in language that aptly captured the significance of the transfor-
mation from confederation to nation—that “[t]he ground Congress 
is operating on now is, in some sense, totally new to it, it makes laws 
that it has the power to enact, instead of resolutions, as before, that 
ended up being generally disregarded.”74  This made for exciting, al-
beit time consuming, work.  As one member noted apologetically, 
“the business of Congress goes on very slow [and] we find almost eve-
ry Act involves great Constitutional principles which require time and 
much disquisition to establish.”75 
Madison, in particular, spoke of the “intricacy” and the “novelty” 
of what was being undertaken, emphasizing that “[a]mong other dif-
ficulties, the exposition of the Constitution is frequently a copious 
source, and must continue so until its meaning on all great points 
shall have been settled by precedents.”76  He also rejected the claim 
 
 71 See CHARLENE BANGS BICKFORD & KENNETH R. BOWLING, BIRTH OF THE NATION:  THE 
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789–1791, at 12 (1989) (describing the composition and de-
mographics of the First Federal Congress). 
 72 Letter from Samuel Osgood to Elbridge Gerry (Feb. 19, 1789), in 1 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS 1788–1790, at 656, 657 (1976). 
 73 Debates in the Convention of the State of North Carolina on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution, in 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION IN 1787, at 1, 
222 (Jonathan Elliot ed., at Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Co. 1891). 
 74 Letter from Comte de Moustier to Comte de Montmorin (June 9, 1789), in 16 
CORRESPONDENCE:  FIRST SESSION:  JUNE–AUGUST 1789, at 729, 732 (Charlene Bangs Bick-
ford et al. eds., 2004). 
 75 Letter from William Few to Governor Edward Telfair (June 20, 1789), in 16 
CORRESPONDENCE:  FIRST SESSION:  JUNE–AUGUST 1789, at 818, 819 (Charlene Bangs Bick-
ford et al. eds., 2004). 
 76 Letter from James Madison to Samuel Johnston (June 21, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON, PAPERS, at 249, 250 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1976). 
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that “the legislature itself has no right to expound the constitution.”77  
Conceding that “in the ordinary course of government . . . the expo-
sition of the laws and constitution devolves upon the judicial.”78  Mad-
ison, nevertheless, refused to accept that Congress had no role to 
play: 
The constitution is the charter of the people to the government; it speci-
fies certain great powers as absolutely granted, and marks out the de-
partments to exercise them.  If the constitutional boundaries of either be 
brought into question, I do not see that any one of the independent de-
partments has more right than another to declare their sentiments on 
that point.79 
That was, of necessity, a qualified endorsement.  Madison recog-
nized that the ultimate responsibility for resolving contested mean-
ings lay with the Court.  Indeed, his criticisms of Marshall’s opinion 
in M’Culloch focused, in important respects, on the extent to which 
“the Court relinquish by their doctrine, all controul on the Legisla-
tive exercise of unconstitutional powers.”80  In the wake of ratification, 
however, the deliberations and actions of the House and Senate were 
part of a process by which “the meaning of the constitution [was] es-
tablished by fair construction.”81  In particular, the new Congress 
needed to chart a path that would avoid the central defect in the con-
federation government, the “want of concert in matters where the 
common interest requires it,” a flaw “strongly illustrated in the state 
of our commercial affairs,” to the point that “the national dignity, in-
terest, and revenue [have] suffered from this cause.”82  As Jack Rakove 
has observed, 
[The] Federalists . . . understood that removing trade barriers among the 
states could create a great domestic market that would become an engine 
of economic growth.  States would still compete for economic advantage, 
 
 77 James Madison, Removal Power of the President (June 17, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON, supra note 76, at 232, 238. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON 447, 449 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908).  For a discussion of this letter and 
Madison’s views, see Mark R. Killenbeck, Madison, M’Culloch, and Matters of Judicial Cogni-
zance:  Some Thoughts on the Nature and Scope of Judicial Review, 55 ARK. L. REV. 901, 920 
(2003). 
 81 James Madison, Removal Power of the President (June 17, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON, supra note 76, at 232, 239. 
 82 James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS 
OF JAMES MADISON (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975), at 348, 350.  I discuss the signifi-
cance of Madison’s Vices paper in Mark R. Killenbeck, A Prudent Regard to Our Own Good?  
The Commerce Clause, in Nation and States, 38 J. S. CT. HIST. 281, 282–85 (2013) (forthcom-
ing 2013). 
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but they would do so under the authority of a national government that 
could promote the free movement of goods, capital, and labor across 
state lines, and prevent states from erecting barriers to free trade.83 
This required legislation, and Congress acted quickly to fill the 
void.  Many of these initial measures arguably reflected an originalist 
vision of the commerce power, focusing narrowly on external matters 
of “deep-water shipping and foreign trade.”84  So, for example, one of 
the very first statutes passed was An Act for Registering and Clearing 
Vessels, Regulating the Coasting Trade, and for other purposes.85  
That measure did not require that ships be registered but granted 
certain privileges to those that were.  Indeed, this statute, albeit in an 
amended form,86 eventually became the basis for the actual holding 
in Gibbons, that the state-conferred monopoly on steamboat naviga-
tion between New York and New Jersey was trumped by an applicable 
federal statute within which “commerce” and “navigation” were the 
same thing.  It is accordingly worth noting that the Coasting Act ap-
parently passed with little or no debate about its constitutionality, a 
reality that verifies John Marshall’s subsequent take on a “power 
[that] has been exercised from the commencement of the govern-
ment.”87 
One way to view the 1789 Act is as a regulatory scheme governing 
any ship “destined from district to district, or to the bank or whale 
fisheries.”88  That formulation appears consistent with a definition of 
commerce confined to “buying and selling products” and “navigation 
and other carriage, and intercourse across jurisdictional lines.”89  It 
 
 83 THE ANNOTATED U.S. CONSTITUTION AND DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 134 (Jack N. 
Rakove ed., 2009). 
 84 Calvin H. Johnson, The Panda’s Thumb:  The Modest and Mercantilist Original Meaning of the 
Commerce Clause, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 1 (2004). 
 85 Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 55.  I began writing about this and other such 
measures long before it became popular as part of the debate about the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act.  See, e.g., Killenbeck, supra note 10, at 92–95 (identifying 
the Act of July 20, 1790 as an example of the first Congress using its Commerce Clause 
power to regulate in ways that are at odds with a narrow, originalist view of commerce); 
Mark R. Killenbeck, The Qualities of Completeness:  More? Or Less?, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1629, 
1649–51 (1999) (stating the same proposition). 
 86 See Act of Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 305 (amending An Act for Registering and Clearing 
Vessels, Regulating the Coasting Trade, and for other purposes). 
 87 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824).  The scant legislative history may be 
found in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, MARCH 4, 1791–MARCH 3, 1791, at 220–80 (Linda Grant De Pauw ed., 
1972).  
 88 Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, § 22, 1 Stat. 55. 
 89 Natelson, supra note 70, at 845.  Natelson’s ultimate argument is that the meaning of 
“commerce” in the late 1700s was an economic one that did not extend to “all gainful 
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certainly included such matters and, in that respect, reflected what 
one might expect in a political climate within which commerce did 
not include other “gainful activities.”  That said, the “districts” in 
question included many located within a single state.  Nor does it fol-
low from the simple act of fishing on the high seas that the resulting 
catch, in any way, will move in interstate or foreign commerce.  More 
tellingly, most of the provisions of the statute did not focus on the 
movement of a given ship, but were rather triggered by the mere fact 
that it “belong[ed] wholly to a citizen or citizens” of the United 
States.90  As such, the 1789 measure becomes suspect if we credit sub-
sequent decisions of the Court, celebrated by many originalists:  opin-
ions that condemn measures regulating “commerce completely in-
ternal to a [s]tate,”91 such as agriculture or manufacturing92 or, more 
tellingly, that do “not confine [themselves] to the interstate com-
merce business which may be done by such persons.”93 
Deviations from the originalist norm are even more pronounced 
in a second important measure approved the following year, An Act 
for the Government and Regulation of Seamen in the Merchants Ser-
vice.94  This statute structured the day-to-day working lives of neces-
sary participants in a continuum that was clearly a part of “mere 
‘trade and exchange.’”95  Nevertheless, both the spirit and letter of 
the law did violence to the narrow reading of commerce, much less 
the power to regulate it.  The act required, for example, “an agree-
ment in writing or in print, with every seaman or mariner on board” a 
ship “bound from a port in one state to a port in any other than an 
adjoining state.”96  It also stated that ships bound overseas must carry 
“a chest of medicines, put up by some apothecary of known reputa-
tion, and accompanied by directions for administering the same.”97  
 
economic activities,” in particular, those that “merely ‘substantially affected’ commerce.”  
Id.  I obviously read the record differently. 
 90 Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 55. 
 91 Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 178 (1908) (holding an act of Congress that crimi-
nalized discrimination against employees associated with labor organizations unconstitu-
tional because it was not related to interstate commerce). 
 92 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 301 (1936) (“That commodities pro-
duced or manufactured within a state are intended to be sold or transported outside the 
state does not render their production or manufacture subject to federal regulation un-
der the commerce clause.”). 
 93 The Emp.s’ Liab. Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 497 (1908). 
 94 Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, 2 Stat. 131. 
 95 Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L. 
REV. 847, 865 (2003). 
 96 Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 1, 2 Stat. 131. 
 97 Id. § 8. 
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And, it mandated that for each person aboard, there be “well secured 
under deck, at least sixty gallons of water, one hundred pounds of 
salted flesh meat, and one hundred pounds of wholesome ship-
bread.”98 
One possibility is to view these strictures as ones embracing “activi-
ties closely incident” to “interstate transportation, navigation, and 
sales.”99  That characterization is, however, at irreconcilable odds with 
decisions of the Court rendered during what originalists would have 
us believe are the “golden” years of Commerce Clause exposition, the 
period during which judicial understandings “still left an extensive 
area of economic life outside the power of Congress.”100  Those deci-
sions did give Congress a certain degree of latitude.  So, for example, 
as the Court stressed in Adair, a federal act was constitutional when 
there was “some real or substantial relation to or connection with the 
commerce regulated.”101  But that same year, in The Employer’s Liability 
Cases, the Court stated, in no uncertain terms, that this connection 
was not present where the measure in question “is not confined solely 
to regulating the interstate commerce business which [employees] 
may do,” but instead, “regulates the persons because they engage in 
interstate commerce and does not alone regulate the business of in-
terstate commerce.”102 
If the new originalists are right about the “original” “public” 
meaning of commerce, then The Merchant Seaman Act clearly ex-
ceeded the scope of the commerce power in two important respects.  
As was the case with the Coasting Act, many of its provisions by their 
express terms were not limited to seamen or vessels engaging in in-
terstate or foreign commerce.103  More tellingly, by purpose and de-
 
 98 Id. § 9.  These “mandates” follow from voluntarily undertaking a positive commercial act 
and engaging in commerce (navigation, actually).  As such, they are not the constitution-
al equivalent of the “missing link” required to sustain the so-called individual mandate as 
a Commerce Clause matter.  Compare Nat’l Fed’n on Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
2566, 2586 (2012) (“Congress has never attempted to rely on [the commerce] power to 
compel individuals not engaged in commerce to purchase an unwanted product.”), with 
JOHN READER, MISSING LINKS:  IN SEARCH OF HUMAN ORIGINS (2011) (describing the 
quest for evidence of fossil proof that human beings and primates, especially chimpan-
zees, share a common ancestor). 
 99 Epstein, supra note 63, at 1454. 
100 Id. at 1410. 
101 Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 178 (1908).  The Court held that, because “interstate 
commerce” does not cover labor organizations, Congress had no power to prohibit the 
discharge of employees based on union membership. 
102 The Emp.’s Liab. Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 497 (1908). 
103 See, e.g., Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 4, 2 Stat. 131  (“[I]f any person shall harbor or se-
crete any seaman or mariner belonging to any ship or vessel.”); id. at § 6 (“[E]very sea-
man or mariner shall be entitled to demand and receive.”); id. at § 7 (“[A]ny seaman or 
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sign, the measure focused on labor relations, rather than the actual 
“activity of interstate [or foreign] transportation.”104 
The First Congress clearly believed that its power to regulate 
commerce extended far beyond the limits imposed by an “objective 
meaning of the text” at the time of ratification that limited the com-
merce power to the actual act of “trade or transportation.”105  That as-
semblage was populated with individuals who both wrote and ratified, 
on both sides of the debate.106  Tellingly, they did not legislate on the 
basis of the narrow, originalist definition.  More to the point, con-
temporary commentators did not characterize these measures as ones 
that required the Necessary and Proper Clause to justify them.107  In 
his edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries, for example, St. George Tuck-
er described the 1790 Act as a pure exercise of the commerce power: 
The right of regulating foreign commerce, draws after it also, the 
right of regulating the conduct of seamen, employed in the merchant 
service; and by a continued chain, that of punishing other persons har-
bouring or secreting them, as well on land, as elsewhere; and the [Mer-
chant Seamen Act] accordingly makes it penal in any person to harbour 
or secret any seaman regularly engaged in the service of any ship.108 
The same can be said of other early federal statutes that cannot be 
squared with an originalist reading of the commerce power that de-
 
mariner, who shall have signed a contract [who has] desert[ed], or . . . absent[ed] him-
self . . . [is subject to] warrant to apprehend.”).  Cf. Emp.s’ Liab. Cases, 207 U.S. at 498 
(stressing that a measure that regulates “without qualification or restriction as to the 
business . . . engaged . . . of necessity includes subjects wholly outside of the power of 
Congress to regulate commerce.”). 
104 R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 374 (1935).  The specific issue here was the 
mandate for a pension plan, defended as a means of promoting “efficiency” and “morale” 
by providing a form of “security,” in much the same way that the 1790 measure operated. 
Id. at 367. 
105 Barnett, supra note 1, at 415, 420. 
106 A fact that Madison stressed was on the subject of using tariffs to “encour-
age[] . . . Manufactures.”  See Letter from James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (Sept. 18, 
1828), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 42, at 316, 332 (stating that in 
“the first Congress under the Constitution . . . the members present were so many” from 
both the federal and state conventions, “each of these classes consisting also of members 
who had opposed & who had espoused, the Constitution in its actual form”). 
107 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 9, at 127 ( “[T]he admitted power to pass navigation laws is 
most accurately conceived as an implied power that was embraced by the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.”); Robert G. Natelson, Tempering the Commerce Power, 68 MONT. L. REV. 95, 
115–17 (2007) (characterizing key aspects of current Commerce Clause doctrine as “me-
morialized textually in the Necessary and Proper Clause”). 
108 St. George Tucker, Appendix, in 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 252 (Philadel-
phia, William Young Birch & Abraham Small, 1803).  While couched in terms of “foreign 
commerce,” Tucker is here discussing an act that was not so limited. 
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nies that Congress has the power to reach criminal acts,109 much less 
those committed within the confines of a state.110  The Merchant 
Seamen Act, for example, made it a crime to “harbor or secrete any 
seaman or mariner” who failed to fulfill his contractual obligations.111  
It also authorized remedies that posed fundamental concerns about 
the sanctity of state sovereignty.  The first made penalties paid by de-
linquent seamen to ship owners “recoverable in any court, or before 
any justice of [sic] justices of any state, city, town or county within the 
United States” that had “cognizance of debts of equal value.”112  The 
second “required” local justices of the peace to resolve controversies 
between owners and seamen over the seaworthiness of a vessel.113 
Several years later, Congress made it a felony to steal goods from a 
shipwreck.114  The Court sustained that statute in United States v. 
Coombs, a case involving goods cast adrift by a ship in distress that had 
come to rest “above high water mark.”115  Citing Gibbons, Justice Jo-
seph Story stressed that “[t]he power to regulate commerce, includes 
the power to regulate navigation, as connected with the commerce of 
foreign nations, and among the states.”116  He rejected the suggestion, 
however, that the separation of the goods from the ship itself limited 
congressional authority to punish their subsequent theft.  The com-
merce power was not “confined to acts done on the water, or in the 
necessary course of the navigation thereof,” but rather, extended to 
“[a]ny offense which thus interferes with, obstructs, or prevents such 
commerce and navigation.”117  Indeed, Story stressed that “Congress 
have, in a great variety of cases, acted upon this interpretation of the 
constitution, from the earliest period after the constitution.”118 
Three federal statutes among the many enacted in the early years 
of the nation are not definitive proof that I am right and that the 
originalists are wrong.  These measures do tell us quite clearly that a 
body acting for the people—one that included a substantial number 
 
109 See, e.g., Natelson, supra note 70, at 845 (“When used in legal discourse, ‘commerce’ did 
not include . . . malum in se crime.”). 
110 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 63, at 1429 (arguing that the result in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 
247 U.S. 251 (1918), was proper “because Congress had used its admitted powers over in-
terstate commerce to eliminate a state’s ‘internal affairs’ completely”). 
111 Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 4, 2 Stat. 131. 
112 Id. § 2. 
113 Id. § 3. 
114 See Act of Mar. 3, 1825, ch. 65, § 9, 4 Stat. 115, 116. 
115 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72, 75 (1838).  The fact that the goods were above the high-water mark 
removed the case from any application of admiralty. 
116 Id. at 78. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
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of individuals who participated in both the drafting and ratification 
debate—held a different view of the commerce power than the one 
supposedly embraced by a “reasonable” late-eighteenth-century read-
er of the text.  It is, of course, always possible that Congress was just 
wrong and that mere politicians could not be trusted to properly 
parse and implement the text.  Gouverneur Morris, for example, 
railed against “legislative lion[s]” prone to parse the “true intent and 
meaning” as “that which suits their purpose.”119  Viewed in that man-
ner, constitutional values and textual fidelity are protected when “the 
judiciary is called upon to declare its meaning.”120 
Which brings me to a second major consideration that argues 
against the narrow originalist reading:  the manner in which the 
commerce power was viewed by the courts in the nation’s formative 
years.  Our focus here will eventually be, as it should be, on Gibbons, 
which provided the first occasion for the Supreme Court to discuss 
the meaning and implications of the Commerce Clause.  It would, 
nevertheless, be a mistake to begin there. 
B.  Commerce in the Courts 
The word “commerce” appeared with some frequency in the offi-
cial reports of the Supreme Court in the years between ratification 
and Gibbons.121  Commerce, that is, but not the Commerce Clause, 
which did not come before the Court for twenty-five years, an argua-
bly surprising development given the central role that concerns about 
the regulation of commerce played in the lead up to the Conven-
tion.122  There are, however, a number of cases within which the 
meaning and implications of the clause were discussed, many of 
which shed interesting light on these matters. 
In 1808, for example, in United States v. The William, United States 
District Judge John Davis was asked to determine whether the 
“[p]ower to regulate” should “be understood to give a power to anni-
 
119 Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering (Dec. 23, 1814), in 3 JARED SPARKS, 
THE LIFE OF GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, WITH SELECTIONS FROM HIS CORRESPONDENCE AND 
MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS, at 323 (Boston, Gray & Bowen, 1832). 
120 James Madison, Removal Power of the President (June 17, 1789) in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON, supra note 76, at 232, 238. 
121 The first reported mention was in Justice Samuel Chase’s opinion in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 
(3 Dall.) 199, 222 (1796).  It was merely descriptive, as was each use of the term in the 
eighty-seven cases within which it appeared leading up to Gibbons.  A diligent author 
would list and parse each to see what they might presage about commonly accepted 
meaning.  Perhaps, another time. 
122 See Killenbeck, supra note 82, at 10–12 (describing the regulation of commerce as a strong 
factor in initiating constitutional reform). 
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hilate.”123  The issue arose in a challenge to the embargo that cut off 
all trade with England.  Davis had been a delegate to the Massachu-
setts ratification convention, had served briefly as Comptroller of the 
Treasury for President George Washington, and was one of the “mid-
night judges” John Adams nominated in February 1801.124  He was, 
obviously, a Federalist, and his support for an expansive reading of 
federal power would not have been a surprise.  His opinion is, never-
theless, notable for the manner in which he treated Commerce 
Clause issues at a point in time during which its “public meaning” was 
supposedly limited. 
Davis began his analysis with a discussion of the need for and sig-
nificance of the clause.  A federal power was essential, he noted, giv-
en “the depressed state of American commerce, and complete expe-
rience of the inefficacy of state regulations, to apply a remedy, were 
among the great, procuring causes of the federal constitution.”125  
The authority conferred was that of a “national sovereignty,” one that 
was not “unlimited,” but “as to the objects surrendered” by the states 
and “specified, limited only by the qualifications and restrictions, ex-
pressed in the constitution.”126  He concluded, accordingly, that  
[t]he care, protection, management and controul, of this great national 
concern, is, in my opinion, vested by the constitution, in the congress of 
the United States; and their power is sovereign, relative to commercial in-
tercourse, qualified by the limitations and restrictions, expressed in that 
instrument, and by the treaty making power of the president and sen-
ate.127   
Davis stressed that the statutes authorizing the embargo “do not 
operate as a prohibition of all foreign commerce.”128  In particular, 
voicing a theme that would be repeated in M’Culloch and Gibbons, he 
posited a rule of deference in such matters:  “the degree, or extent, of 
the prohibition” was properly determined by “the national govern-
ment,” to which the power to regulate commerce had been “commit-
ted.”129  He also appeared to embrace a narrow definition of the term 
 
123 28 F. Cas. 614, 621 (D. Mass. 1808) (No. 16,700). 
124 BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1789–2000, at 459 (2001). 
125 The William, 28 F. Cas. at 620. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 620–21. 
128 Id. at 621. 
129 Id.; see also M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (“[T]he sound 
construction of the constitution must allow to the national legislature [significant] discre-
tion, . . . enabl[ing] that body to perform the high duties assigned to it . . . .”); Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188 (1824) (stressing that a “narrow construction” of the 
Commerce Clause “would cripple the government, and render it unequal to the object 
for which it is declared to be instituted”). 
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commerce, even as he refused to exclude matters beyond its reach 
from the federal power to regulate them:  “The term does not neces-
sarily include shipping or navigation; much less does it include the 
fisheries.  Yet it never has been contended, that they are not the 
proper objects of national regulation; and several acts of congress 
have been made respecting them.”130 
Davis rejected the suggestion that “these are incidents to com-
merce, and intimately connected with it; and that congress, in legis-
lating respecting them, act under the authority, given them by the 
constitution, to make all laws necessary and proper.”131  The proper 
focus was not on what was “expedient,” but instead on the “abstract 
question of [actual] constitutional power.”132  Viewed in that light, “I 
see nothing to prohibit or restrain the measure[s],” given that 
the power to regulate commerce is not to be confined to the adoption of 
measures, exclusively beneficial to commerce itself, or tending to its ad-
vancement; but, in our national system, as in all modern sovereignties, it 
is also to be considered as an instrument for other purposes of general 
policy and interest.  The mode of its management is a consideration of 
great delicacy and importance; but, the national right, or power, under 
the constitution, to adapt regulations of commerce to other purposes, 
than the mere advancement of commerce, appears to me unquestiona-
ble.133 
A less expansive, but no less suggestive, view was taken by Chancel-
lor James Kent in Livingston v. Van Ingen,134 one of the lower court 
opinions leading to Gibbons.  Kent anticipated a debate that between 
Chief Justice Marshall and Associate Justice William Johnson in Gib-
bons when he stressed that the federal power was “not, in express 
terms, exclusive.”135  His discussion of the nature of the power was 
nevertheless narrow:  “[t]he congressional power relates to external 
not to internal commerce, and it is confined to the regulation of that 
commerce.”136  This meant, in those areas and others, that “the states 
 
130 The William, 28 F. Cas. at 621. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id; see id. at 622 (“[N]ational regulations relative to commerce . . . are not necessarily con-
fined to its direct aid and advancement.”). 
134 9 Johns. Cas. 507 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812). 
135 Id. at 577.  Marshall suggested, without actually saying so, that the power was concurrent, 
with Johnson arguing in his concurring opinion that federal authority was exclusive.  
Compare Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824) (“The completely internal 
commerce of a State . . . may be considered as reserved for the State itself.”), with id. at 
236  (Johnson, J., concurring) (stating that the Constitution gave Congress “exclusive 
grants . . . of power over commerce”).  The Court eventually opted for concurrent powers 
in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 308 (1851). 
136 Livingston, 9 Johns. Cas. at 578. 
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are at liberty to make their own commercial regulations,”137 albeit on-
ly unless and until the federal government acted. 
This ended the matter for the purposes of the case at hand, given 
Kent’s subsequent judgment that a license granted under the Coast-
ing Act “only gives to the vessel an American character” and, as such, 
conferred no positive rights.138  That said, Kent did not embrace the 
sharp delineations adhered to in the originalist account, conceding 
three things that are entirely consistent with a more expansive read-
ing.  The first was that “[t]he capacity to grant separate and exclusive 
privileges appertains to every sovereign authority.”139  The second, 
consistent with the assumption that a coasting license did not regu-
late commerce, was that any navigation rights conferred by New York 
should “be considered as taken subject to such future commercial 
regulations as congress may lawfully prescribe.”140 
Third, and most important, Kent acknowledged that there was 
room for disagreement.  Congress did not have “any direct jurisdiction 
over our interior commerce or waters.”141  Nevertheless, drawing the 
line between federal and state authority was not an easy task, given 
the intimate connection between internal and external matters.  “The 
limits” of the federal power, he observed, “seem not to be susceptible 
of precise definition.  It may be difficult to draw an exact line be-
tween those regulations which relate to external and those which re-
late to internal commerce, for every regulation of the one will, direct-
ly or indirectly, affect the other.”142 
These two decisions provide an interesting backdrop to Gibbons, 
within which Marshall largely repeated views previously expressed 
about the scope of the term commerce and the extent of the com-
merce power.  Sitting as a Circuit Justice in May 1820, Marshall con-
sidered the appeal of a ship owner whose vessel had been confiscated 
for bringing into the port at Norfolk, Virginia “three persons of col-
our, not being native citizens or registered seamen.”143  The specific 
 
137 Id. 
138 Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. 150, 157 (N.Y. Ch. 1819). 
139 Livingston, 9 Johns. Cas. at 573. 
140 Id. at 579. 
141 Id. (emphasis added). 
142 Id. at 578.  Kent subsequently stated, in the wake of Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons, that 
“[t]he only great point on which the Supreme Court of the United States, and the courts 
of this state, have differed, is in the construction and effect given to a coasting license.”  1 
JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 411 (New York, O. Halsted 1826).  That 
conclusion was, however, based on a reading of Gibbons that glossed over the careful qual-
ifications Marshall made as he discussed the internal/external commerce distinction. 
143 The Wilson v. United States, 30 F. Cas. 239, 240 (C.C.D. Va. 1820). 
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question before him was whether Congress had the authority to pass 
the measure prohibiting these acts.144  Marshall began this discussion 
by asking, “What is the extent of this power to regulate commerce?  
Does it not comprehend the navigation of the country?  May not the 
vessels, as well as the articles they bring, be regulated?”145  He stressed 
that “[t]he authority to make such laws has never been questioned; 
and yet, it can be sustained by no other clause in the constitution, 
than that which enables congress to regulate commerce.”146  Indeed, 
he argued that “[f]rom the adoption of the constitution, till this time, 
the universal sense of America has been, that the word ‘commerce,’ 
as used in that instrument, is to be considered a generic term, com-
prehending navigation, or, that a control over navigation is necessari-
ly incidental to the power to regulate commerce.”147 
Marshall did not, obviously, tell us whether this “universal sense of 
America” was that of Joe the Ploughman or an educated, Federalist 
elite.  His language, nevertheless, implied that this understanding was 
the one embraced consistently by anyone familiar with the meaning 
and use of the term.  In other words, just as I have argued, Marshall 
was here appealing to an original and consistent public embrace of 
commerce and the commerce power that was not as narrow as the 
one championed by the new originalists. 
Marshall’s subsequent gloss in Gibbons has become a central part 
of every law student’s education.  Rejecting an attempt to “limit 
[commerce] to traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of 
commodities,”148 he declared, 
This would restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one of 
its significations.  Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something 
more:  it is intercourse.  It describes the commercial intercourse between 
nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by pre-
scribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.  The mind can scarcely 
conceive a system for regulating commerce between nations, which shall 
exclude all laws concerning navigation, which shall be silent on the ad-
mission of the vessels of the one nation into the ports of the other, and 
be confined to prescribing rules for the conduct of individuals, in the ac-
tual employment of buying and selling, or of barter.149 
Generations of law students have snickered at Marshall’s use of 
the term “intercourse,” envisioning exactly what one account sug-
 
144 See Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 10, 2 Stat. 205 (prohibiting the importation of persons of col-
or who were not registered seamen or native citizens). 
145 The Wilson, 30 F. Cas. at 242. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 243. 
148 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824). 
149 Id. at 189–90. 
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gests, “‘Sexual Intercourse Among the . . . States.”150  This was not, 
however, simply a “rhetorical device.”151  Rather, Marshall was using 
the first listed definition in Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary that com-
merce is “[i]ntercourse; exchange of one thing for another; inter-
change of any thing; trade; traffick.”152  There was, at the time, an ar-
guably close association between the two terms.  So, according to 
Johnson, the definition of “intercourse” was “commerce, exchange.”  
I cannot say what Joe would have thought if he came upon the term 
“intercourse” alone, on a page.  I do suspect that in the context of a 
discussion of the Constitution, he would almost certainly have associ-
ated intercourse with commerce. 
Marshall’s definition allowed him to do what was necessary to re-
solve the claim before him.  The federal coasting license held by 
Thomas Gibbons was a constitutionally sound regulation of com-
merce, properly defined.  As such, it preempted New York’s attempt 
to confer a monopoly via the license issued to Aaron Ogden.  Some 
scholars have taken issue with this approach, agreeing with the New 
York courts that a federal coasting license simply designated a vessel 
as American and did not confer any independent authority to engage 
in trade or commerce.153  That is certainly a viable conclusion.  Many 
sections of the act were simply descriptive.  Key provisions, however, 
were consistent with Marshall’s reading, referring, for example, to 
vessels “destined from district to district, or to the bank or whale fish-
eries,” and to those “employed in . . . trade.”154 
Does this matter?  It’s certainly an interesting question as a matter 
of statutory interpretation.  Our focus, however, is on what Marshall 
had to say about the nature and scope of the federal power to regu-
late commerce.  Given what followed in the wake of Gibbons, two ele-
ments of the Marshall opinion must be examined with care:  his dis-
cussion of the distinction between interstate and intrastate commerce 
 
150 Natelson, supra note 79, at 835. 
151 Id. at 835 n.226. 
152 SAMUEL JOHNSON, 1 A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London:  W. Strahan, 
1755). 
153 Professor White, for example, characterizes Marshall’s conclusion that the coasting li-
censes conferred a “right to trade” as “dubious,” stating that the statute “was designed to 
identify American ships operating in coastal waters so that they could be free from duties 
and other requirements imposed on foreign vessels.”  1 G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY:  FROM THE COLONIAL YEARS THROUGH THE CIVIL WAR 240 (2012).  
That position tracks the one taken in one of the New York decisions.  See N. River Steam 
Boat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 713, 742 (N.Y. 1825) (“[T]he effect of a coasting license 
was considered . . . and . . . adjudged to give no right whatever.”). 
154 See Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, § 22–23, 2 Stat. 305 (amending An Act for Registering and 
Clearing Vessels, Regulating the Coasting Trade, and for other purposes). 
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and his thoughts on commerce, narrowly understood, as distinct 
from other productive activities, most notably agriculture and manu-
facturing. 
Marshall clearly stressed the centrality of the intra/interstate dis-
tinction: 
It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that com-
merce, which is completely internal, which is carried on between man 
and man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and 
which does not extend to or affect other States.  Such a power would be 
inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.155 
Marshall also discussed the nature of certain activities whose 
object . . . is to improve the quality of articles produced by the labour of a 
country; to fit them for exportation; or, it may be, for domestic use.  They 
act upon the subject before it becomes an article of foreign commerce, 
or of commerce among the States, and prepare it for that purpose.156 
Speaking specifically of state inspection laws, he states, 
They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation, which embraces 
every thing within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general 
government:  all which can be most advantageously exercised by the 
States themselves.  Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every 
description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a 
State, and those which respect turnpike roads, ferries, &c., are compo-
nent parts of this mass.157 
Both of these elements of Gibbons became central factors in subse-
quent decisions, within which the Court used that case as the justifi-
cation for sharply limiting the scope of the federal commerce power.  
The inter/intrastate distinction, for example, was a central element 
in Paul v. Virginia, in which the Court held that insurance policies is-
sued in one state and in force in another “are not articles of com-
merce in any proper meaning of the word,” but are rather “local 
transactions, and are governed by the local law.”158  In a similar vein, 
in one of its most famous—or infamous, depending on one’s world 
view—pronouncements, A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
a majority of the Court held that the Live Poultry Code was “not in 
terms limited to interstate and foreign commerce.”159  The poultry in 
question “had come to a permanent rest within the State,” with 
 
155 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824).  Cf. id. (“Comprehensive as the word 
‘among’ is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more 
States than one.”). 
156 Id. at 203. 
157 Id. 
158 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1868). 
159 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935). 
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“[n]either [its subsequent] slaughtering nor . . . [its] 
sale . . . [constituting] transactions in interstate commerce.”160 
An insistence that there was a difference between commerce and 
other productive activities in turn surfaced repeatedly in the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.  In Kidd v. Pearson, for ex-
ample, the Court held that Iowa could bar the production of “intoxi-
cating liquors,” even though they were produced solely for distribu-
tion and consumption outside the state.161  Quoting Gibbons, Justice 
Lucius Quintus C. Lamar stressed that the founding generation 
“‘must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense 
and to have intended what they have said.’”162  He then stated, in no 
uncertain terms, 
  No distinction is more popular to the common mind, or more clearly 
expressed in economic and political literature, than that between manu-
factures and commerce.  Manufacture is transformation—the fashioning 
of raw materials into a change of form for use.  The functions of com-
merce are different.  The buying and selling and the transportation inci-
dental thereto constitute commerce.163 
In a similar vein, in United States v. E. C. Knight Co.,164 the Court 
ruled that Congress could not bar a monopoly in the manufacture of 
refined sugar.  Citing Gibbons, the majority stressed that “[t]hat which 
belongs to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the United States, 
but that which does not belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction 
of the police power of the State.”165  And, in Hammer v. Dagenhart, Jus-
tice William Rufus Day wrote for a Court that struck down a federal 
child labor act, stressing that “[t]he goods shipped are of themselves 
harmless” and “the production of articles, intended for interstate 
commerce, is a matter of local regulation.”166 
These are certainly colorable interpretations of what Marshall said 
in Gibbons.  However, they also require that we filter what was said 
there through a particular lens.  More tellingly, they ignore certain 
key passages in Marshall’s opinion. 
 
160 Id. at 543. 
161 128 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1888). 
162 Id. at 20 (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 188)). 
163 Id. 
164 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
165 Id. at 12. 
166 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918).  See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 298–99 (1936) (pos-
iting that commerce does not include the act of mining or manufacturing itself).  Rob 
Natelson, to his credit, sticks to his narrow-meaning guns and declares “[f]or my purpos-
es, it is enough to say that, from a purely originalist point of view, cases like Carter Coal Co. 
and Schechter Poultry were rightly decided after all.”  Natelson, supra note 70, at 848. 
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Marshall certainly did state that “[t]he completely internal com-
merce of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for the State 
itself.”167  But, how should we read the key phrase, “completely inter-
nal?”  The full sense of what Marshall meant and said emerges only if 
we consider this sentence and phrase in the light of what preceded 
them: 
The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its 
action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to 
those internal concerns which affect the States generally; but not to those 
which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other 
States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purposes of 
executing some of the general powers of the government.  The complete-
ly internal commerce of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for 
the State itself.168 
Marshall is here stating quite clearly that Congress exceeds its author-
ity only when it tries to reach those aspects of commerce “completely 
within a particular state” that, tellingly, “do not affect other States.”  
This is a far cry from a declaration that “the commerce power did not 
extend to wholly intrastate commerce.”169 
Marshall believed that the exercise of federal power would be 
proper when it focused on “those internal concerns which affect the 
States generally.”170  As a result, he speaks of the need to avoid 
“interfer[ing]” with internal state matters only as a general proposi-
tion, unless such actions are undertaken for “the purpose of execut-
ing some of the general powers of the government.”171  Madison 
agreed, noting in 1827 that “[t]hroughout the succeeding Congress-
es, till a very late date, the power over commerce has been exercised 
or admitted, so as to bear on internal objects of utility or policy, with-
out a reference to revenue.”172 
What about the distinction between commerce and other matters?  
Justice William Rufus Day argued for the majority in Hammer that 
Marshall’s discussion of inspection laws in Gibbons should be read to 
draw a sharp contrast between commerce and, in particular, agricul-
 
167 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824). 
168 Id. 
169 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 595 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).  Justice 
Thomas is here relying on what “the Court had earlier noted,” id., i.e., on the line of cases 
within which the Court, to my mind, departed from what Marshall actually said in Gibbons. 
170 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195. 
171 Id. 
172 Letter from James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (Mar. 22, 1827), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON, supra note 42, at 284, 286.  The focus here was on tariffs, but the general 
proposition is consistent with the record. 
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ture or manufacturing.173  But, his account of what Marshall had to 
say is incomplete, and he does not consider the implications of what 
Marshall says next: 
No direct general power over these objects is granted to Congress; 
and, consequently, they remain subject to State legislation.  If the legisla-
tive power of the Union can reach them, it must be for national purpos-
es; it must be where the power is expressly given for a special purpose, or 
is clearly incidental to some power which is expressly given.  It is obvious, 
that the government of the Union, in the exercise of its express powers, 
that, for example, of regulating commerce with foreign nations and 
among the States, may use means that may also be employed by a State, 
in the exercise of its acknowledged powers; that, for example, of regulat-
ing commerce within the State.174 
This may, or may not, require invocation of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.  Marshall does speak of “direct,” “express,” and “inci-
dental” powers.  Nevertheless, he quite clearly declares that the fed-
eral government—as part of the power to “regulate commerce among 
the States”—may use the very same means that the states employ 
when they “regulate commerce within the State.”  This is a far more 
robust vision of the commerce power than the one championed un-
der the banner of “original” “public” meaning.  It is also, notably, the 
one that New York’s Court for Correction of Errors—its highest court 
at the time—accepted in the wake of Gibbons. 
The issue was whether the state of New York could bar a steam-
boat, the Olive Branch, from plying the Hudson River between New 
York City and Albany.  The ship’s owners initially used the artifice of a 
brief stop in Jersey City, New Jersey as a way to establish the “inter-
state” character of the journey within the meaning of Gibbons.175  They 
then abandoned that pretext, with multiple subsequent voyages going 
directly from New York to Albany and back. 
Chancellor Nathan Sanford agreed that “circuitous navigation” via 
Jersey City was permissible, but granted the Livingston-Fulton syndi-
cate’s request for an injunction barring the purely intrastate trips.176  
On appeal, a substantial majority of the court agreed with Chief Jus-
tice Nathan Savage that the direct trips were also permissible.  Quot-
 
173 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 274 (1918) at 203) (“‘They [inspection laws] act 
upon the subject before it becomes an article of foreign commerce, or of commerce 
among the states, and prepare it for that purpose.’” (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)) 
(alteration in the original). 
174 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 203–04. 
175 While most of the facts can be mined from the reported opinion in the case, those wish-
ing to read a clear and succinct account should see JOHNSON, GIBBONS, supra note 64, at 
138–45. 
176 N. River Steam Boat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 713, 716, 719–20 (N.Y. 1825). 
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ing the same passages from Gibbons we have looked at, Savage agreed 
that the “‘completely internal commerce of a state, then, may be con-
sidered as reserved for the state itself.’”177  However, he read Mar-
shall’s opinion as establishing clearly “that over a part of the internal 
commerce of the states, congress has power.”178  Stressing that the 
Gibbons Court had no reason to determine “how far that power ex-
tends,” Savage declared that “it is clearly inferrible, that all that part 
of the internal commerce of a state which is not exclusively internal, is 
subject to the regulation of congress.”179  This, he stressed, was con-
sistent with Marshall’s observations about the power of Congress to 
legislate “‘for national purposes.’”180 
Facilitating the coasting trade was one such purpose, a form of 
“commercial intercourse carried on between different districts in dif-
ferent states, between different districts in the same state, and between differ-
ent places in the same district, on the sea coast or on a navigable river.”181  
One notable aspect of this was the extent to which Savage character-
ized his opinion as an exercise in applied original public meaning.  
He emphasized that “[t]o show the understanding of those who 
framed and adopted the constitution, we have only to look at the acts 
of congress immediately consequent upon its adoption.”182  Congress, 
acting in the immediate wake of ratification, had passed the Coasting 
Act, “a contemporaneous exposition of the constitution with which 
all were satisfied; and it was not then thought that state boundaries 
had any effect or influence upon this kind of navigation.”183 
It is always possible that the majority was simply doing what it felt 
the Marshall opinion compelled and that its broad reading did not 
reflect any sort of independent judgment.  The earlier parallel con-
clusions by Davis and Kent suggest otherwise, providing support for a 
“public” “meaning” of commerce in the wake of ratification that is 
broader than the new originalists suggest.  Regardless, it seems quite 
clear that a full and careful reading of Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons 
supports what Justice Jackson said in Wickard:  that it was well past 
time to return to Marshall’s original, public meaning. 
 
177 Id. at 749 (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195). 
178 Id. at 745. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 734 (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 203). 
181 Id. at 747. 
182 Id. at 752. 
183 Id. 
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C.  Necessary, or Proper? 
One final aspect of the debate about these matters needs to be 
addressed:  are the answers found in the Commerce Clause alone or 
via a combination of it and the Necessary and Proper Clause?  This is, 
in certain important respects, largely beside the point.  All parties to 
the debate about the commerce power agree that the “sweeping 
clause” is a proper part of the equation.  There is, nevertheless, con-
siderable room to worry about these matters if, for example, the ques-
tion is whether a given federal measure is “proper” precisely because 
it regulates something other than commerce, narrowly defined.  
That, I take it, is the real objection in a dialogue within which various 
individuals argue that the narrow definition of commerce that pre-
vailed before the New Deal “wrong turn” has never actually been re-
pudiated, with the Court relying instead on “the Necessary and Prop-
er Clause to allow Congress to regulate economic activities that were 
neither interstate nor commerce because such activities had a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce.”184 
As a threshold matter, the assumption that the proper pre-New 
Deal definition was actually as narrow as the new originalists claim is 
simply wrong, at least if we credit what Congress did in the wake of 
ratification and what Marshall actually said in Gibbons.  Let’s assume, 
nevertheless, that there is something to worry about if and when the 
Necessary and Proper Clause enters the picture.  It is quite clear that 
Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons contemplated that the sweeping clause 
could become part of the inquiry.  His discussion of the inter-
nal/external question and of the ability of Congress to reach “other 
productive activities” includes language that makes this obvious.185  
The argument is, accordingly, about whether Marshall’s approach to 
these matters is doctrinally lax, conflating “necessity” and “conven-
ience” in ways that do violence to the proper understanding and ap-
plication of the clause. 
My take on these matters is simple, perhaps deceptively (or delu-
sively?) so.  The classic formulation of the necessary and proper in-
quiry is the one Marshall stated in M’Culloch:  “Let the end be legiti-
 
184 Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People:  Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate Is 
Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 584 (2010).  He is not the only one to make 
this claim.  See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. 
REV. 795, 807–11 (1996) (discussing the New Deal Court’s use of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to “enlarge the scope of the Commerce Clause”); Natelson, supra note 70, 
at 795 (discussing the Supreme Court’s use of the Necessary and Proper Clause to allow 
Congress to regulate non-commercial activities “substantially affecting” commerce). 
185 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195, 203–04. 
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mate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means 
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which 
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the consti-
tution, are constitutional.”186  Marshall did, as part of the lead-up to 
this rule, state that “[t]o employ the means necessary to an end, is 
generally understood as employing any means calculated to produce 
the end, and not as being confined to those single means, without 
which the end would be entirely unattainable.”187  He also argued that 
the clause should not be read to deny “the power of Congress to 
adopt any which might be appropriate, and which were conducive to 
the end.”188 
Critics focus on these initial passages and characterize Marshall’s 
approach as one that “dismisse[s], almost casually, concerns about 
how such an open-ended grant of discretionary power square[s] with 
the theory of limited and enumerated powers.”189  I might well share 
these concerns, but for the fact that the actual operative test is much 
narrower.  At the risk of repetition, Marshall’s did not condone “any 
means” and, while he speaks of those that are “appropriate,” his ex-
planation of that term stresses that they must be “plainly adapted to 
that end,” must not be “prohibited,” and must comport with both 
“the letter” and the “spirit of the constitution.”190  That was the stand-
ard invoked by Justice Breyer for the Court in a recent, focused dis-
cussion of these matters, United States v. Comstock, within which he 
quoted Marshall’s test and declared that “[w]e have since made clear 
that, in determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants 
Congress the legislative authority to enact a particular federal statute, 
we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is rational-
ly related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated 
power.”191 
Justice Thomas correctly emphasized in his Comstock dissent that 
there is ample room to argue about whether “the end is in fact legit-
imate,” that is, whether it is “one of the Federal Government’s enu-
 
186 M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
187 Id. at 413–14. 
188 Id. at 415. 
189 Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 183, 200 (2003).  
190 M’Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.  For whatever reason, Professor Barnett does not 
quote this passage in his second article on this subject, the one written after he had 
adopted an originalist methodology.  See Barnett, supra note 189, at 184 n.12 (speaking of 
a change in position since the publication of Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and Proper, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 745 (1997)). 
191 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010). 
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merated powers.”192  A narrow vision of “commerce” might provide a 
basis for maintaining that any use of the term other than “sale or 
trade” is not “legitimate,” that it is inconsistent with both the “letter” 
and the “spirit” of a clause whose meaning was fixed at the time of 
ratification.  As I have argued, however, key members of the Found-
ing cadre made it quite clear that the Constitution’s meaning was not 
fixed in that manner, and initial implementation of the commerce 
power verifies a broader reading. 
What about the argument that Marshall’s gloss of the sweeping 
clause deprives the Court of its essential role as definitive expositor of 
the Constitution?  Randy Barnett stresses the long-running debate 
about the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States as part of 
his discussion of these matters, recounting in some detail, in particu-
lar, Madison’s opposition to the First Bank and his “immediate” nega-
tive reaction to Marshall’s opinion in M’Culloch.193 
He is absolutely correct in one important respect:  Madison did 
express deep concerns about the extent to which Marshall’s approach 
signaled “a latitude in expounding the Constitution which seems to 
break down the landmarks intended by a specification of the Powers 
of Congress, and to substitute for a definite connection between 
means and ends, a Legislative discretion as to the former to which no 
practical limit can be assigned.”194  It is, nevertheless, important to 
recognize that the focus here was on whether the Supreme Court 
would continue to be an effective check on Congress, as opposed to 
posing fundamental questions about implied powers or state rights. 
As a general matter, Madison had no problem with deference to 
the considered judgments of Congress.  As he stressed in Vices, “the 
fundamental principle of republican Government [is] that the major-
ity who rule in such Governments, are the safest Guardians both of 
public Good and of private rights.”195  Indeed and, ironically, one of 
the major focuses in that document was the absence of any meaning-
ful federal power to regulate commerce.196  In this respect, he tracked 
an observation that Hamilton made in Federalist 36, when he observed 
that “[t]he real scarcity of objects in this country, which may be con-
sidered as productive sources of revenue, is a reason peculiar to itself, 
 
192 Id. at 1975 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
193 See Barnett, supra note 189, at 188–94, 201–02 (discussing the constitutionality of the na-
tional bank and the ambiguity inherent in the term “necessary”). 
194 Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON, supra note 80, at 447, 448. 
195 James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS 
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 82, at 348, 354. 
196 Id. at 350 (“This defect is strongly illustrated in the state of our commercial affairs.”). 
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for not abridging the discretion of the national councils in this re-
spect.”197  This was entirely consistent with the position Marshall took 
in Gibbons, in which he emphasized that  
[t]he wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the peo-
ple, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, 
in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, 
the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its 
abuse.198 
Madison’s critique of M’Culloch was, then, not about the nature of 
the congressional powers recognized.  Rather, it focused on the pos-
sibility that the Court would not serve as an effective check if and 
when an abuse occurred.  This was not, then, the Madison who had 
rejected the notion of a national bank based on his belief that there 
was no express power given to Congress that comported with a Nec-
essary and Proper Clause whose “meaning must, according to the 
natural and obvious force of the terms and the context, be limited to 
means necessary to the end, and incident to the nature of the specified 
powers.”199  It was, rather, a Madison who—based on experience—
believed it essential that Congress act on the basis of “an obvious and 
precise affinity” between “means” and “ends.”200  And, that it was in-
cumbent on the Court to see to it that this was what actually hap-
pened. 
The problem here is, of course, that one person’s deference is 
another’s abdication, with a substantial number of these judgments 
colored by perspective.  For example, I am perfectly willing to accept 
the argument many have made that we need to ignore Gunning Bed-
ford Jr.’s proposal that Congress be given the ability “to legislate in all 
Cases for the general Interests of the Union . . . and . . . in those Cas-
es to which the States are separately incompetent.”201  That “almost 
completely open-ended grant of power to Congress” was indeed re-
jected “in favor of the enumeration of particular powers and the an-
cillary Necessary and Proper Clause.”202 
 
197 THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, at 229 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
198 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).  A similar position was taken in 
Champion v. Ames (Lottery Case), in which the Court stated “if Congress is of opinion . . . we 
know of no authority in the courts to hold that the means thus devised are not appropri-
ate and necessary to protect the country at large.”  188 U.S. 321, 358 (1903). 
199 James Madison, The Bank Bill (Feb. 2, 1791), in 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 372, 
376 (Robert A. Rutland et al., eds. 1981). 
200 Id. 
201 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 131. 
202 Barnett, Necessary and Proper, supra note 189, at 185. 
Nov. 2013] MEANING OF “COMMERCE” 325 
 
What, then, are we to make of Madison’s statement that the Con-
stitution sought a “national Government . . . armed with a positive & 
compleat authority in all cases where uniform measures are neces-
sary[?]”203  Madison argued for the creation of an effective national 
government.  Its powers would, he stressed, be limited.  Nevertheless, 
these powers needed to be real, especially in the face of state intran-
sigence:  “If Congress have not the power it is annihilated for the na-
tion.”204  Madison believed, accordingly, that one of the primary vir-
tues of the new system would be that any truly “‘necessary & proper’” 
congressional action would have the purpose and effect of fashioning 
a “uniform & practical sanction” in the face of dangers posed by 
competing or contradictory state regimes.205 
In other words, we do not need Gunning Bedford and/or Resolu-
tion VI to get where we need to go.206  Madison and his colleagues 
provide more than enough support for a “middle ground, which may 
at once support a due supremacy of the national authority, and not 
exclude the local authorities wherever they can be subordinately use-
ful.”207  Indeed, in one of the most telling passages of his opinion in 
North River Steam Boat Company, Chief Justice Savage asked “why 
should we more apprehend an abuse of power, or an act of usurpa-
tion, by the general than by the state governments?”208  He then 
stressed, in language that accounts for current federalism concerns, 
but also places them in appropriate perspective, that “I am fully sen-
sible of the propriety of preserving the state governments, with all 
their rights and powers:  but this is by no means inconsistent with 
conceding to the general government its appropriate powers.”209 
CONCLUSION 
Madison repeatedly invoked a portion of the new originalist man-
tra, stating, for example, that “I entirely concur in the propriety of re-
 
203 Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 8, 1787), in  9 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON, supra note 82, at 368, 370. 
204 Letter from James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (Mar. 22, 1827), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON, supra note 42, at 284, 330. 
205 Id. at 332–33. 
206 For the pros and cons of these matters, compare Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collec-
tive Action Federalism:  A General Theory or Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 115–16 
(2010), with Kurt T. Lash, “Resolution VI”:  The Virginia Plan and Authority to Resolve Collec-
tive Action Problems Under Article I, Section 8, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2123, 2123–24 (2012). 
207 Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON, supra note 82, at 382, 383. 
208 N. River Steam Boat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 713, 754 (1825). 
209 Id. 
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sorting to the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and rati-
fied by the nation.”210  He also argued that “the very best keys to the 
true object & meaning of all laws and constitutions” are “the original 
evils & inconveniences, for which remedies were needed.”211  So, in 
the lead up to the Constitutional Convention, he counseled that the 
participants should focus on “the mortal diseases of the existing con-
stitution,”212 problems caused by a system of governance that was “in 
fact nothing more than a treaty of amity of commerce and of alliance, 
between so many independent and Sovereign States.”213  In particular, 
he argued that there was a need to address “the present anarchy of 
our commerce,”214 a state of affairs that argued for a strong, positive 
commerce power at the federal level and protections against the ex-
tent to which “repetitions” of current problems “may be foreseen in 
almost every case where any favorite object of a State shall present a 
temptation.”215 
These are important perspectives, ones that must play a central 
role in any discussion of both the case for the new originalism and 
originalist discussions of the commerce power.  As is the reality for 
Madison and others, as opposed to Joe the Ploughman, ratification 
marked a beginning, rather than an end. 
Where does all of this leave us?  I don’t for a moment believe that 
what I have said will lead to a “Eureka!” moment, with the new 
originalists declaring “if only we knew!”  I also do not in any way 
claim that my account is the only possible one, given the breadth and 
complexity of the record.  I do know that there is ample reason to be-
lieve that the meaning of a constitution was not fixed at the moment 
of ratification.  Rather, its terms were to be “liquidated and ascer-
tained” over time, in the light of experience.  I also know that stand-
ard originalist accounts of what John Marshall actually said in Gibbons 
 
210 Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON, supra note 42, at 190, 191.  See Letter from James Madison to John G. Jackson 
(Dec. 27, 1821), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 42, at 70, 74 (“[I]t was 
the duty of all to support [the Constitution] in its true meaning as understood by the na-
tion at the time of its ratification.”). 
211 Letter from James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (Sept. 18, 1828), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON, supra note 42, at 284, 334.  
212 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON, supra note 82, at 317, 318. 
213 James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS 
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 82, at 348, 351. 
214 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 18, 1786), in 8 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 500, 502 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973). 
215 James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS 
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 82, at 348, 348. 
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either ignore or treat as “mere dicta” passages in that opinion that 
cast the “original” “public” meaning of the Commerce Clause in a 
new light. 
Does that make me an originalist?  Indeed, does that matter?  I 
really don’t know. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
